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1  Introduction
This study implements the idea described in Hirayama (to appear,a) as to why 
evidentials resist the environment under negation and epistemic modals, based on 
three indirect evidentials: the English apparently and seem, and the Japanese yooda. 
Section 2 reviews the findings presented in Hirayama (to appear,a), and Section 3 
examines the evidence referred to by those evidentials. Section 4 provides a dynamic 
account for the findings, following a discussion of the not-at-issue dimension of the 
evidential component. Lastly, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2  A review
This section reviews the findings of Hirayama (to appear,a), in which the semantic 
contribution of evidentials cannot be under the scope of negation and epistemic 
modals. Before discussing data, a note on the syntactic properties of English and 
Japanese is in order. In English, the surface ordering of the evidentials and other 
operators in the rest of the sentence is not directly reflected in their scope relation. 
Specifically, let EV and OP be an evidential and another operator such as negation and 
epistemic modals, respectively. If a sentence contains both EV and OP, then there are 
potentially two scope relations: EV > OP and OP > EV.
 On the other hand, Japanese is often said to be a scope-rigid language, where 
the surface ordering of operators determines the scope interpretation, especially as 
far as the right periphery is concerned. The difference between the two languages is 
exemplified in (1).
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(1) a. John might have won the game. (Rullman and Matthewson (2018:281))
  Available: It is possible that John won the game.
  Available: It was possible that John would win the game.
 b. John-ga siai-ni kat-ta kamosirenai.
  John-NOM game-to win-PAST might
  ‘John might have won the game’
  Available: It is possible that John won the game.
  Unavailable: It was possible that John would win the game.
As is seen in the possible interpretations, the English might have combination allows 
either might or PAST to scope over the other operator. However, the Japanese PAST-
kamosirenai sequence can only be interpreted as kamosirenai, which is located in a 
more peripheral position than PAST, scoping over PAST. PAST has to be located to the 
right of kamosirenai in order to take a wider scope. Therefore, if OP1 is located to the 
right of OP2, the the only available scope relation is OP1 > OP2. Evidentials, as we will 
see, cannot take a wider scope over negation and epistemic modals. As a result, the 
EV-OP sequence in Japanese (where OP stands for negation or epistemic modals) is 
infelicitous, regardless of the context.
 Let us start with negation. First, the Japanese yooda cannot tolerate being under 
the scope of negation:
(2) #Ame-ga fut-tei-ru yoode-nai.
   rain-NOM fall-PROG-PRES yooda-NEG
   ‘(Intended) It is not the case that it seems that it is raining.’
In (2), yooda is located to the left of negation, which means that negation scopes 
over yooda. The oddness of (2) suggests the unavailability of such a scope relation.
 Turning to English cases, I assume that the semantic contribution of evidentials 
that interacts with negation and epistemic modals is to convey that the speaker has 
perceived an event that instantiates the proposition serving as evidence of the 
prejacent (henceforth, evidence proposition), as in Davis and Hara (2014). 
Informally, an evidential contributes the speaker’s perception of such an event to the 
context.
 With this assumption, negation scoping over evdientials amounts to saying that 
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there is no evidence on the part of the speaker. The context of (3) forces this 
interpretation, which evidentials cannot tolerate:
(3)  (You have been working in a windowless room with thick walls that prevent 
you from hearing sounds from outside, so you cannot know the condition of 
the weather. You say to yourself:)
 a. #Apparently it is not raining.
 b. #It does not seem that it is raining.
In (3), the speaker has no information about the weather outside the room, and hence 
has no evidence of the prejacent it is raining. The examples in (3) would be 
acceptable if negation took a wider scope than negation.
 Next, we examine the interaction with epistemic modals. As is seen in (4), 
yooda is infelicitous if it is in the scope of epistemic modals:
(4) #Ame-ga fut-tei-ru yoo-dearu kamosirenai.
   rain-NOM fall-PROG-PRES yooda-COP might
 ‘(Intended) It is might be the case that it seems that it is raining.’
In English, apparently and seem show resistance to the case where epistemic modals 
take wider scope over the existential statement on evidence, that is, where the 
existence of evidence is inferre
1）
d.
(5)  (You are working in a room, and you hear something hitting the roof. You 
think that it might be rain, but you know that sometimes rats run around the 
attic, so it might be the sound of rats. You say to yourself:)
 a. #Apparently it might be raining.
 b. #It might seem that it is raining.
What can serve as evidence of rain in this case is the sound of rain hitting the roof. 
However, the speaker is not sure whether it is actually the sound of rain. Therefore, 
the context in (5) implies only that it is possible that the speaker has perceived 
evidence of rain (i.e., the sound of rain hitting the roof), which is the wider-scope 
reading for might. The incompatibility of the sentences in (5) with this context shows 
44
that such a scope relation cannot be obtained.
 Note that there are attested examples in which the contribution of might scopes 
over that of seem:
(6)  When they all get off the bus at the same stop, Julian’s mother offers the boy 
a penny–a foolish gesture of noblesse oblige–and the boy’s mother punches 
the old lady, leaving her stricken on the sidewalk. On first reading, it might 
seem that what destroys Julian’s mother is the violent attack by the large 
woman, who represents the rage of the whole black race, according to Julian. 
However, it becomes painfully evident in the staged performance that it is 
Julian’s cruelty toward his mother that kills her. (COCA 2015)
In this example, seem is anchored to the addressee rather than to the speaker; in other 
words, it refers to the addressee’s evidence. This situation is different from that in 
(5b), where seem refers to the speaker’s evidence. This becomes clearer, given the 
following contrast:
(7) a. #It is possible that it seems that it is raining.
 b.  It is possible that it seems to John that it is raining.
Assuming that seem has a strong tendency to be interpreted as being anchored to the 
speaker, the contrast in (7) indicates that the speaker-anchored seem cannot fall 
within the scope of modals. However, such a scope relation is available when seem is 
anchored to someone else. This study focuses on the speaker-anchored seem, and 
leaves the treatment of the someone-else-anchored seem for future research.
 Note that the scope properties of the evidentials we discussed thus far are not 
specific to English and Japanese. A number of previous studies (Aikhenvald (2004), 
Faller (2002), Matthewson et al. (2007), Murray (2010), among others) have found 
that the evidentials they address always take a wider scope than negatio
2）
n.  Although 
the unavailability of the wider scope of epistemic modals has not been studied as 
extensively as negation has, Faller (2002) observes that Quzco Quechua evidentials 
are obligatorily interpreted as having a wider scope than that of an epistemic modal.
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3  Evidence as knowledge
In the previous section, we assumed that one of evidentials’ contributions is to assert 
the speaker’s perception of the evidence. This section observes that, in addition to 
this contribution, evidentials require that the evidence be part of the speaker’s 
knowledge. This is motivated by the observation by Takubo (2009) that the evidence 
that evidentials refer to must not be hypothetical:
(8)  (A and B have been working in a room with the curtains closed, and so do not 
know anything about the weather. Now, A opens the curtains and sees puddles 
on the ground:)
   A: There are puddles.
 a. #B: Then, apparently it rained.
 b. #B: Then, it seems that it rained.
 c. #B: Sorenara ame-ga fut-ta yooda.
         then rain-NOM fall-PAST yooda
         ‘Then, it seems that it rained.’
In (8), the speaker’s evidence is not her own; she has not witnessed the puddles 
herself. Rather, the speaker hypothetically assumes from A’s utterance that there is 
evidence of rain (i.e., puddles). The oddness of B’s replies in (8) indicates that 
hypothetical information does not qualify as evidence of evidentials’ prejacents.
 If evidence is required to be part of the speaker’s knowledge, the oddness of 
those replies follows straightforwardly; in (8), the speaker does not know the 
proposition serving as the evidence, that is, the proposition there are puddles on the 
ground, because it comes from A’s report. McCready (2010a) argues, from a 
different perspective, that all evidentials require their evidence to be knowledge. Her 
argument is based on the observation that Japanese evidentials are judged to be 
infelicitous when the speaker is not sure whether her evidence is real. Specifically, 
the use of evidentials is odd when the speaker suspects that her cognition might not 






This section provides a formal account for why evidentials resist being under the 
scope of negation and epistemic modals. I adopt the framework of update semantics 
following Veltman (1996). Section 4.1 introduces some basic notions, such as 
information state, update, and treatment of operators. Section 4.2 discusses the 
assertoric content sof an utterance versus it not-at-issue content, including how it has 
been treated in dynamic systems. Section 4.3 presents my proposed semantic 
contribution of evidentials, where evidentials contribute to two levels of meaning, 
and illustrates how it captures the data presented in Section 2.
4.1  Basic notions
I assume that the context is modeled with the common ground (cg) which is the set 
of propositions known by every participant in the discourse or the context set (cs), 
which is the set of worlds compatible with the knowledge of every participant, that 
is, ∩cg. When someone utters an ordinary proposition p that is the set of worlds 
where p is true, it is regarded as a proposal to update the context such that the 
updated common ground will include p. Thus, if the proposal is approved, the 
resulting context set is the intersection of the context set before the update and p.
(9) a. cg = {p: p is known by every participant in the discourse}.
 b. cs = ∩cg = {w: ∀q[q ∈ cg → w ∈ q]}.
 c.  If p is the set of p-worlds, then updating cs with p, represented as cs[p], is 
a proposal to add p to cg; that is, cs[p] = cs∩p.
 Propositions with operators such as negation and epistemic modals update the 
information state as in (10). A negated proposition ¬p in (10a) subtracts from cs the 
result of updating cs with p, hence eliminating p-worlds from cs. Unlike p and ¬p, 
propositions with epistemic modals do not eliminate worlds. They test whether the 
current context set meets a certain condition. As in (10b), ◇p, corresponding to 
might p, tests whether the intersection of cs and p becomes empty or not. If the result 
is not empty, that is, if there is at least one p-world (p-possibility) in cs, cs passes the 
test, and the input information state returns untouched. If the intersection becomes 
empty, that is, if there is no p-world in cs, it returns the empty set, which is a 
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contradiction. Although this study focuses on possibility modals such as might and 
kamosirenai, (10c) presents the treatment of □p (must p); defined as the dual of ◇p 
(cf., von Fintel and Gillies (2007)).
(10) a. cs[¬p] = cs－cs[p].
 b. cs[◇p] =
cs  if  cs∩p ≠ ０




 c. cs[□p] = cs[¬◇¬p].
4.2  Assertion versus not-at-issue content
The semantics of a sentence sometimes contribute to more than one level of 
meaning; in addition to the truth-condition or the assertoric content, known as at-
issue content, a sentence may have non-at-issue content that is a presupposition or a 
conventional implicature of the sentenc
4）
e.  I do not distinguish clearly between 
presuppositions and conventional implicature. Instead, I use the notion of not-at-
issue content as the semantic content that is associated with the lexical meaning of 
words occurring in a sentence, but that does not contribute to its truth-conditional 
dimension.
 Not-at-issue content differs from at-issue content in various ways. According to 
Potts (2003), conventionally implicated content does not have scope interactions with 
other operators, such as negation, modals, and attitude predicates. Furthermore, 
because they are not part of an assertion, which is a main point of the utterance, the 
addressee cannot deny not-at-issue content upon hearing a sentence that includes 
such. Given that appositive content is not-at-issue, we have the following:
(11) A:   Tivi, who is a cat, likes to chase her tail.
 B:   No, she doesn’t (like to chase her tail). She’s afraid of it.
 B: #No, she isn’t (a cat). (Murray (2014:2))
In the conversation in (11), B cannot deny the appositive content Tivi is a cat, 
because it is not part of the assertion or the truth-condition.
 Murray (2010, 2014) argues that the evidential component (i.e., information 
about the existence and type of evidence) of Cheyenne evidentials is not-at-issue, 
48
because it projects through negation, as in (12a), and cannot be the target of denial, 
as in (12b):
(12) a.  É-sáa-némené-he-sėstse Floyd.
   3-NEG-sing-AGR-REP.3SG Floyd
    Available: ‘Floyd didn’t sing, they say’ / Unavailable: ‘Floyd sang, they 
didn’t say’ (Murray (2010:62))
 b.  A:   É-némene-sėstse Kathy.
       3-sing-REP.3SG Kathy
       ‘Kathy sang, I hear.’
   B:   No, she didn’t (sing). She danced.
   B: #No, you didn’t (hear that). (Murray (2014:4))
Neither the negation in (12a) nor B’s denial in (12b) can target the evidential 
component (the information that the user of the reportative evidential has heard 
about the content of the prejacent). These patterns parallel the evidentials examined 
here. In Section 2 we saw that the speaker’s perception of the evidence cannot be 
negated. In addition, it cannot be the target of denial, as (13) shows:
(13) a.  A:   Apparently it is raining.
   B: # That’s not true. It is raining but you have never seen evidence such 
as puddles!
 b.  A:   It seems that it is raining.
   B: # That’s not true. It is raining but you have never seen evidence such 
as puddles!
 c.  A:   Ame-ga fut-tei-ru yooda.
       rain-NOM fall-PROG-PRES yooda
       ‘It seems that it is raining.’
   B: #Sore-wa tigau. Ame-wa fut-tei-ru ga kimi-wa
       that-TOP wrong rain-NOM fall-PROG-PRES but you-TOP
       mizutamari-no-yoona syooko-o mi-tei-nai.
       puddle-GEN-such.as evidence-ACC see-PERF-NEG
       ‘ That’s wrong. It is raining but you have never seen evidence such as 
puddles.’
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In her replies, B admits the truth of the prejacent in the sentence uttered by A, but 
tries to deny that she has perceived the evidence of the prejacent. The infelicity of B’
s replies suggests that the evidential component of these evidentials is part of the 
not-at-issue content.
4.2.1  Digression
One might be tempted to explain the scope phenomena reviewed in Section 2 by 
postulating that the evidential component is not-at-issue, as Murray (2010, 2014) 
proposes for Cheyenne evidentials. This postulation accounts for English data, 
because it captures the fact that the evidential component is never interpreted under 
the scope of negation and epistemic modals. However, it is insufficient for Japanese 
data, where the sentences are unacceptable, rather than having only one of the two 
possible scope relations. Even if yooda’s evidential contribution is not-at-issue 
content, this does not rule out sentences in which negation or epistemic modals are 
located to the right of the evidential, but where the evidential component should 
project to the whole sentence. If this were true, it would make such sentences have 
only one scope relation, as in English cases. Therefore, we need to explain how the 
scope relations ¬ > EV and MODAL > EV result in a semantic or pragmatic anomaly, 
which is why the sentences containing these relations are unacceptable.
 It may seem possible that the syntactic assumption on Japanese (that it is a 
scope-rigid language) blocks the projection of the conventional implicature, making 
the whole sentence uninterpretable. Specifically, as we saw at the beginning of 
Section 2, in Japanese, if an operator OP1 is located to the right of another operator 
OP2, then OP1 has a wider scope than OP2. In the bad examples in (2) and (4), the 
negation and epistemic modal are located to the right of yooda. Then yooda’s 
evidential component tries to project, but the surface word order and the scope-
rigidity require it to be under the scope of those operators, which blocks the 
projection. As a result, there is no available interpretation for these sentences. Is such 




 ‘The teacher, who is being honored, came’
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This sentence is only felicitous when the speaker respects the teacher at the utterance 
time. This means that the honorific component projects beyond the contribution of 
the past tense. However, the past tense marker is located to the right of the honorific 
marker. If the projection-blocking mechanism described is in effect, (14) should be 
deviant, like (2) and (4). The discussion thus far indicates that the evidentials we are 
dealing with have some not-at-issue content, evidenced by the deviance of (13). 
However, postulating simply that the evidential component is not-at-issue does not 
help to explain Japanese data, and a more desirable analysis of evidentials would be 
the one that can accommodate Japanese cases as well as English cases.
4.2.2  The treatment of the evidential component in dynamic semantics
Murray (2014) proposes that sentences with evidentials in Cheyenne present three 
semantic contributions: the at-issue proposition, a not-at-issue restriction, and an 
illocutionary relatio
5）




 ‘Sandy won (I witnessed).’ (Murray (2014:7))
(15) updates the context set in the following way. First, it introduces the at-issue 
content p (in this case, Sandy won) to the discourse, but this information is not added 
to the common ground (hence, no elimination of worlds in the context set). Second, 
the not-at-issue restriction, which  is the information that the speaker has direct 
evidence of the prejacent, in this case, restricts the context set to the set of worlds 
compatible with the not-at-issue information. In this case, the context set becomes 
the set of worlds divided into p-worlds and ¬p-worlds where in both, the speaker 
directly witnesses the proposition Sandy won. Finally, the illocutionary relation, 
which is contributed by the illocutionary mood of the sentence, comes into effect. 
For the declarative sentence in (15), it is the proposal to add the at-issue proposition 
to the common ground. If this proposal is accepted, the new context set will be the 
set of worlds where both Sandy won and the speaker has direct evidence of the event.
 What is important in the subsequent discussion is the difference in how the at-
issue proposition and the not-at-issue information update the context. Whereas the 
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former offers a proposal to eliminate worlds where it is not true, the latter is a direct 
update: it updates the context set without negotiation. In other words, the addressee 
can refuse the update with the at-issue content, but cannot do so the non-at-issue 
content. Somewhat simplifying Murray’s (2014) analysis, I formulate the update 
process associated with a sentence containing both at-issue and not-at-issue contents 
as in (16b), borrowing Potts’s (2003) notation as in (16a):
(16) a.   p • q denotes an expression where p and q are its at-issue and not-at-issue 
content, respectively.
 b.  cs[p • q] = (cs∩q)[p].
Note that (cs∩q)[p] differs from cs[q][p], which corresponds to cs[q∧p]. Here 
cs[q∧p] is a proposal to update cs with q∧p, whereas (cs∩q)[p] is a proposal to 
update the context set that is already restricted by q. This expresses Murray’s 
intuition that not-at-issue content is taken for granted by conversational participants.
4.3  Proposal
I propose the following semantic contribution of the three evidentials examined here:
(17) Let q be a contextually salient proposition.
 a.  EVID   = λp.λw. ∃e[q(e)(w) ∧ PERCEIVE(cS)(e)(w)] 
 •λp.λw. KNOW(cS)(q)(w) ∧ IND-EVID(q)(p)(w)
 b.  PERCEIVE(cS)(e)(w) = the speaker has perceived e in w.
 c.  KNOW(cS)(q)(w) = the speaker knows that q is true in w.
 d.  IND-EVID(q)(p)(w) = q serves as indirect evidence of p in w 6）.
A proposition with evidentials yields both at-issue content and a not-at-issue content. 
The at-issue content states that the speaker perceives an event that describes the 
evidence proposition. The not-at-issue content states that the speaker knows that the 
evidence proposition is true and that it counts as indirect evidence of the prejacent. 
Because the denotation of (17a) consists of two dimensions of meaning, a familiar 
functional application is not an available option when EVID is applied to the prejacent. 
I adopt the mixed application proposed by McCready (2010b:20), which distributes 
the argument to both the at-issue and not-at-issue content of the functor. As a result, 
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the argument slots for a proposition in both dimensions are saturated by the prejacent 
(Note that the variable p does not appear in the at-issue content, which means that it 
is not affected by the prejacent after the application of EVID to the prejacent).
 The not-at-issue content, requiring the speaker to know the evidence 
proposition, is based on McCready’s (2010a) observation, reviewed in Section 3, and 
captures the oddness of evidentials when the evidence is hypothetical, that is, (8). I 
repeat only the apparently case below:
(18)  (A and B have been working in a room with the curtains closed, and so do not 
know anything about weather. Now, A opens the curtains and sees puddles on 
the ground:)
    A: There are puddles.
  #B: Then, apparently it rained.
Let RAIN and PUDDLE be propositions denoting it rained and there are puddles, 
respectively. Then B’s utterance is represented as in (19a), and it updates the context 
as in (19b):
(19) a.  EVID RAIN  = λw. ∃e[PUDDLE(e)(w) ∧ PERCEIVE(B)(e)(w)]
    • λw. KNOW(B)(PUDDLE)(w) ∧ IND-EVID(PUDDLE)(RAIN)(w).
 b.  cs[EVID RAIN]
 =  (cs ∩ λw.KNOW(B)(PUDDLE)(w) ∧ IND-EVID(PUDDLE)(RAIN)(w))
 [λw.∃e[PUDDLE(e)(w) ∧ PERCEIVE(B)(e)(w)]].
The requirement that the speaker knows the truth of the evidence proposition is the 
not-at-issue content of B’s utterance. Therefore, that information is added to cs be-
fore the at-issue update, which proposes creating a new context set that consists of 
worlds compatible with the at-issue proposition and the intersection between cs and 
the not-at-issue content. In the context of (18), however, both A and B know that B 
does not know the evidence proposition, that is, that there are puddles. This means 
that cs, which is the set of worlds compatible with every participant’s knowledge, 
consists only of worlds where B does not know the evidence proposition. There- 
fore, intersecting cs with λw. KNOW(B)(q)(w) results in the empty set, which is a 
contradiction. Thus, the formulation in (17) theoretically captures the deviance when 
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evidentials are used without knowledge of the evidence.
 One might argue against the proposal in (17), which posits that the speaker’s 
evidenceacquisition event is the at-issue content of the utterance. As shown in (13), 
the addressee’s denial cannot target the information that the speaker is acquainted with 
the evidence, as in (13a), repeated below as (20):
(20) A:   Apparently it is raining.
 B: # That’s not true. It is raining but you have never seen evidence such as 
puddles!
This observation exhibits a similar pattern to that of the Cheyenne data in (12), and 
is consistent with Murray’s (2014) analysis, where the evidential component, which 
describes the speaker’s acquisition of evidence and the evidence type, is located in 
the not-at-issue dimension. The current analysis in (17) incorporates the acquisition 
event into the at-issue content, so it might appear that this is incompatible with the 
oddness of the examples in (13).
 However, note that while the current analysis treats the existential quantification 
over the acquisition event as the at-issue content, the requirement that the speaker 
know the truth of the evidence proposition is not-at-issue. Given that not-at-issue 
content is taken for granted by conversational participants, when B tries to deny that 
the speaker has perceived evidence of the prejacent, that is, to reject the proposal to 
eliminate worlds where such an acquisition event has occurred, cs has already been 
the set of worlds in which the speaker knows that the evidence proposition is true. 
Denial of the evidence acquisition event implies that A does not know the truth of 
evidence (although the logical meaning of KNOW does not preclude the possibility 
that the speaker has perceived the event describing a proposition she knows). 
Therefore, B’s denial is incompatible with the not-at-issue content that A knows the 
truth of the evidence proposition. Thus the current analysis correctly predicts (20) to 
be an illicit conversation, because B’s reply winds up challenging the not-at-issue 
content of A’s utterance.
4.4  Deriving the scope facts
We start with the unavailability of the wider scope of negation, that is, (2) and (3). 
Henceforth, I abbreviate the at-issue content of EVID RAIN (i.e.,λw. ∃e[q(e)(q) ∧  
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PERCEIVE(cS)(q)(w)]) as PERCEIVE, and the not-at-issue content (i.e., λw. KNOW(cS)
(q)(w) ∧ IND-EVID(q)(p)(w)), as KNOW-IND-EVID. Given that negation operates 
only on the at-issue content, the speaker’s utterance in those examples (NEG + EVID + 
RAIN) denotes (21).
(21) NEG EVID RAIN = ¬PERCEIVE • KNOW-IND-EVID.
This utterance updates the context set in the following way:
(22) cs[NEG EVID RAIN]
 = (cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID)[¬PERCEIVE]
 = (cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID) － (cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID)[PERCEIVE].
The not-at-issue update is applied first, narrowing down the input context set to the 
set of worlds where the speaker knows that the evidence proposition is true, which 
counts as indirect evidence of rain. Then, among those worlds in the restricted set, 
negation subtracts worlds where the at-issue proposition is true, that is, where the 
speaker has perceived an event that describes the evidence proposition. The resulting 
set consists of those worlds where the speaker knows that the evidence proposition is 
true, but she has never perceived any event instantiating that proposition. As 
mentioned at the end of the previous subsection, this is pragmatically odd; Given the 
familiar Hintikka-style semantics of knowledge ascription, the semantics of KNOW do 
not guarantee that the agent to whom the knowledge is ascribed will have 
experienced an event that instantiates the prejacent of KNOW. However it seems 
inconceivable that one knows the truth of a proposition without experiencing such an 
event. Therefore, the resulting context is unacceptable because of the pragmatic 
anomaly, rather than the semantic contradiction shown in (8).
 The claim that knowing a proposition pragmatically implies the existence of the 
acquisition event is supported by the unavailability of knowledge ascription in the 
following scenario. Suppose that you know that if it is raining, then there are puddles 
on the ground. You are now seeing falling raindrops from the window, but you do not 
see the condition of the ground. Now,  you know  that it is raining. Combining this 
and the background conditional knowledge, your knowledge state entails that there 
are puddles on the ground (i.e., there are puddles on the ground in all worlds 
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compatible with your knowledge). However, it is difficult to say that you know 
that there are puddles on the ground. This suggests that knowledge ascription 
to an agent requires the acquisition even
7）
t.   Whether this requirement is really 
pragmatic or incorporated into the lexical semantics of KNOW is a topic of future 
research. However it at least explains why the resulting context set in (22) is 
unacceptable.
 Next, we examine epistemic modals. Given the traditional treatment of might in 
dynamic semantics, we have the following update process (note that the contribution 
of the possibility epistemic modal does not scope over the not-at-issue content):
(23) cs[♢EVID RAIN]




(cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID) if (cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID) ∩ PERCEIVE ≠ ０
   ０                                        if (cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID) ∩ PERCEIVE = ０
Here, (23) contains a possibility epistemic modal (kamoshirenai in Japanese and 
might in English), so it poses a test on the context set. The resulting test checks 
whether there remains at least one world after intersecting cs ∩ KNOW-IND-EVID 
(the set of worlds compatible with participants’ knowledge and the proposition that 
the speaker knows the truth of the evidence proposition) and PERCEIVE (the 
proposition that the speaker has perceived an event describing the evidence 
proposition). However, this test plays no role, given that knowing something (at 
least) pragmatically accompanies experiencing it. If this test fails, it returns the 
empty set only if all worlds in the original context set cs are those where the speaker 
knows that the evidence proposition is true, but she has never perceived an 
instantiating event. As shown above, if we know that a proposition is true, it 
(pragmatically or semantically) implies that we have perceived some instantiation of 
that proposition. Therefore, such an input context set is quite inconceivable, and 
regardless of the nature of the context set, it passes the test posed by the epistemic 
modal. This, in turn, means that the epistemic modal does not make any contribution 
to the utterance. That is, [♢EVID RAIN] becomes [EVID RAIN], which violates Crnič’s 
(2011) principle of non-vacuity:
(24)  The meaning of a lexical item used in the discourse must affect the meaning 
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of its host sentence (either its truth-conditions or its presuppositions).
 (Crnič (2011:110)).
 In summary, the scope relation ¬ > EV results in a contradiction between 
PERCEIVE and KNOW, and the relation ♢ > EV violates the pragmatic principle in 
(24). These effects are obtained because PERCEIVE and KNOW are distributed over 
two separate meaning dimensions. This line of analysis is not found in previous 
studies such as Murray (2014), where the evidential component contributes only to 
the not-at-issue dimension.
5  Conclusion
This study analyzes why the three indirect evidentials yooda, apparently, and seem 
cannot be under the scope of negation and epistemic modals. The proposed 
contribution of these evidentials is based on McCready’s (2010a) observation that 
evidence must be part of the speaker’s knowledge, and on Murray’s (2014) argument 
that evidentials contribute to both the at-issue and not-at-issue dimensions. The 
proposed theory empirically more adequate than previous theories because it 
captures the deviance of Japanese data, which cannot be explained by assuming that 
evidential components are not-at-issue only.
[Notes]
＊ This paper is the extended and revised version of Hirayama (to appear,a), and has 
benefited from the valuable comments and suggestions by Eri Tanaka and Lisa 
Matthewson. Needless to say, all remaining errors are my own. This work was 
supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number: 18J10406.
1) Krawczyk (2012:43) states that apparently is incompatible with might in the first 
place. However, Hirayama (to appear,a) shows that there are attested examples where 
apparently and might appear in the same clause.
2) This property is not a universal one; Aikhenvald (2004) observes that some evidentials 
can scope under negation.
3) McCready revises her argument in McCready (2014), where she observes that 
evidentials can be used even if the evidence is not part of the speaker’s knowledge. 
Specifically, they are felicitous in the Gettier scenario (cf., Ichikawa and Steup (2018)). 
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Given this observation, McCready argues informally that an evidential user must have 
the belief that she knows the evidence. My idea, presented in Section 4, can be 
implemented even with this complication, but I adopt her former argument for the sake 
of space.
4) Here, I put aside Gutzmann’s (2015) notion of use-conditional contents, which he 
seems to distinguish from conventional implicature. In addition, I focus on the 
conventional meaning of a sentence; thus I am not talking about conversational 
implicature and pragmatic effect that are not directly associated with the conventional 
meaning of lexical items that occur in the sentence.
5) Murray’s (2014) formalization, which builds mainly on Bittner (2011), is more 
elaborate than that introduced here. Nevertheless, my informal introduction is 
sufficient for the current discussion.
6) Here, we do not delve into the question of what it means for a proposition to be 
indirect and to be evidence of another proposition. The reader is referred to several 
recent studies, such as Krawczyk (2012), Davis and Hara (2014), Koev (2017), and 
Hirayama (to appear,b) that address this question.
7) This is as opposed to the indirect requirement proposed by von Fintel and Gillies (2010) 
for the English epistemic modal must; their analysis states that in order for must to be 
used adequately, the set of worlds created by intersecting all propositions the speaker 
knows must entail (or be subset of) the prejacent, but the prejacent must not be one of 
those propositions; in other worlds, the speaker must not directly perceive the prejacent.
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SUMMARY
A Dynamic Account for the Scope Properties of Evidentials
Yuto Hirayama
This study provides a formal implementation of Hirayama (to appear,a), where I 
associate the unavailability of the wider-scope reading of negation and epistemic 
modals over evidentials with McCready’s (2010a) requirement that evidence referred 
to by evidentials must be part of the speaker’s knowledge. I review the findings in 
Hirayama (to appear,a) on three evidentials, the English apparently and seem, and 
the Japanese yooda, and McCready’s discussion of evidence as knowledge. After 
introducing the framework of dynamic semantics (following Veltman (1996)), I refer 
to Murray’s (2014) argument that the evidential component, a semantic component 
signaling how the speaker has acquired the evidence, is not-at-issue content. Murray’s 
analysis is compatible with some of the data in Hirayama (to appear,a), but it cannot 
explain the deviance of Japanese examples. My proposal is to distribute the 
evidential component to two dimensions of meaning, that is, to the at-issue 
dimension and not-at-issue one. With this proposal, if negation or epistemic modals 
take a wider scope over evidentials, the resulting context will always be 
unacceptable.
